Grassroots Democracy in Rural China
How effective are the villagers committees, and do they represent an institutionalization towards real democracy?
Thomas de Groot
Leiden University, Faculty of Humanities, School for Asian Studies
Course: Political Reform in Contemporary China
Instructor: T. W. Ngo
10-11-2008
...Two bowls (one filled with rice and the other half-filled with water) are placed on the underside of the village god’s stake. Then the presiding monk picks up an egg, breaks it and slides the contents into the bowl with water. Each of the candidates takes a thatch stalk and breaks it at one end to make a hook-shaped tip and then places it against the side of the bowl. The monk covers the bowls with a dustpan cover and scatters some rice over the cover while chanting. Half an hour later, he removes the dustpan cover and tries to pick the egg in the bowl with the hook-tipped thatch stalks made by the candidates. The candidate whose stack hook hooks the egg white is believed to be the divinely ordained kaxie[1]...
(Election process for the divine Kaxie of the Lahu-people on the Lancang-river)
INTRODUCTION
China scholars have been wrestling to find appropriate terms to describe the Chinese situation as the People’s Republic enters the twenty-first century[2]. It’s system is not democratic, but there are elections on the village level. China claims to be a Socialist state, but the Chinese market economy has driven the country to the position of international financial power broker. The questions are numerous. Is China moving towards democracy? Have the rural reforms made in the past thirty or so years made a real difference? Does it generally mean that when elections are held, be it at the village-level, that a system is more democratic, more free? Do free –or semi-free, elections equal political participation? What are the underlying principles or motives that moved the leadership to introduce political reform? What does the economic development mean for China’s political landscape? In this paper I shall try to analyze two questions that are equally puzzling. How efficient are the Villagers Committees in governing rural affairs? Do the village elections signal a move towards significant democracy?
HOW DID VILLAGERS COMMITTEES COME ABOUT ?
Let me first quickly characterize the current situation in the politics of rural China. When the Chinese government introduced the household-responsibility-system in 1983[3], the traditional production-brigades disappeared. The socialist commune system with it’s production brigades started to whither, as farmers could now freely sell their land. Families were free to seek a profitable way of exploiting the land that they now really owned[4]. Apart from economical independence, this development also meant that the authority of the production leader didn’t exist anymore. The economic reforms, set out in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, thus also created a need for administrative changes[5]. Production was privatized, and now there was a power-vacuum on the lowest level of administration. Two villages in Guanxi Province (independently) put together a makeshift villagers committee in 1981 to solve this vacuum of power. The revolutionary aspect of these committees was that they functioned as a governing body for the villagers, by the villagers. Interestingly, the authorities were never consulted[6]. In an article written for the China Quarterly in 2000, China scholars O’Brien and Li show how the reforms came to be. They tell of Peng Zhen, a member of the politburo who became inspired by the actions of these villages in Guanxi. It was thanks to his efforts that the Villagers Committees were written into the constitution. In 1984, the Villagers Committees were officially noted in the Organic Rules on Villagers Committees. In 1988, after fierce lobbying by Peng Zhen, the Organic Law for Villagers Committees was implemented nationwide. However, after the Tiananmen square-incident and it’s Pro-Democracy Movement in 1989 the conservatives within the Party found new reasons to oppose institutionalization of villagers self-governance. It was again Peng Zhen who campaigned to keep the law from being abolished. By 1993, the majority of Chinese villages had held elections to compose a representative Villagers Committee.
HOW ARE VILLAGES GOVERNED?
Before we look at the degree of openness in these elections, and see how free they really are, let us first investigate the functioning of these Villagers Committees. The Chinese village is the lowest level of administration. It is ruled by two bodies: the Villagers Assembly (村民会议 / cunmin huiyi ) and the Villagers Committee (村民委员会 / cunmin weiyuanhui ). In theory, the Assembly is more powerful than the Committee[7]. According to a study done by Oi and Rozelle in 2000, the Villagers Assembly was designed to be a directly elected body to represent the National People’s Congress on the lowest level. However, as the Ministry of Civil Affairs put it, this proved inefficient. They changed the directly democratic structure of the Assemblies to a representative system. In 2000, the Villagers Representative Assembly had replaced the Villagers Assembly in half of all the villages. Oi and Rozelle show that the authority of the Assemblies is limited, because the attendance of the members is halfhearted, the assemblies are still largely crowded with unelected (CCP-) members, and their study also shows that the assemblies convene very infrequently. An average of twice a year does not exactly display capability to decide on every day affairs. So then should it be the Villagers Committee to have the day-to-day authority? The Villagers Committees are compiled by members of the party and villagers representatives. They are elected every three years through village elections. It seems that the traditional production team leader from the Mao- era has been replaced by these committees. Oi and Rozelle seem to think that the real decision making takes place in these committees, or amongst the local Party cadres of course[8]. But now that production is privatized, what is the role of the village leadership? According to the Organic Law for Villagers Committees, it is the committee’s responsibility to develop public services, manage public affairs, mediate civil disputes, help maintain social stability and report to the villagers opinions, requests and suggestions[9]. This doesn’t really tell us much. Maybe it is good to look at individual villages to see what the tasks of the local leadership are.
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE VILLAGES
Peking University’s Rong Ma investigated the political reforms in a Mongolian grasslands village called Hurqige. Rong explains that under the old system of production brigades, the livestock and farmland was divided equally among the villagers by the leaders. Production was managed centrally, as was the annual harvest. Now, the farmers are their own boss, and the production team leader, now called the Villagers Committee, is left with the task of overseeing the taxation. Even though the members of the committees still act as community leaders, Rong puts it, their function is quite limited these days[10]. However, we must keep in mind that in the smallest villages, particularly those whose prime economic base is agriculture, life has been roughly the same for a thousand years. The typical Chinese village consists of a few households who farm their land and raise their livestock, and continue to do so, no matter the administrative changes that the central government makes. Yang Shenming shows how irrelevant any village leadership is, especially as a representative of the central government, to a small town community. He tells of the Tajik people in the Tashikuergan Tajik Autonomous Region in the far North-West of China. What this study shows is that the Villagers Committees do not have a great role in the daily lives of the villagers, because they are largely autarchic in their survival. They have been raising sheep for centuries. There is hardly any economy to manage, and the community is so tight that the taxation is being done routinely by the village elders. Again, the leadership of the Villagers Committee is mostly ceremonial[11].
EFFECTIVITY OF VILLAGERS COMMITTEES
So we shouldn’t look at the smallest farming communities when investigating the functioning of village leadership. What about the larger villages, where the economy is supported by industry and service sectors? Many scholars have pointed to the different links between economy and rural governance. It seems that the more industrialized villages have a greater interest in the proper functioning of their local authorities. Not only is the need for local infra-structure much more obvious, but in an industrialized economy, the linkage with the outside world is very strong. Villagers need proper representation to maximize their profits. Also, when farming is industrialized, the market for farmland is a big motor for the local economy. The regulatory body for this market is supervised by the Villagers Committee, and so we can state that the dependency of the villagers on the local leadership is much greater. What this dependency implies, is that the committee has a great role in rural governance[12]. We can conclude that the role local government has in village affairs differs depending on the base of the economy of the village. As many have pointed out, when villagers have a clear interest in the well functioning of the local leaders, this means two things: the role of a village committee is not solely ceremonial, and there is a greater chance for increased democratization. I will address the forces behind this grassroots democracy later on in my paper. For now we can say that the efficiency of such a small administrative entity as the Villagers Committee fully depends on the economy of the village. As a production leader, it’s part may have been played out, but the leader of a community can play a big role in helping to further develop the economy. There is, in short, a definite rationality for the existence of Villagers Committees in China.
DEMOCRATIZATION
What can we say, then, about the “gradual democratization” people keep talking about? My research question is whether the village elections, now common practice all over China, represent a move towards grassroots democracy. First of all, let me state that this supposed moved towards democracy is not directly linked to the underlying intentions of the government. Whatever the central leadership, being Leninist in it’s core[13], plans on doing with China, the fact of the matter is that in 2000, free or semi-free elections were held in 734.715 of China’s nine hundred thousand or so villages[14]. It is said that the introduction of villagers self-governance and direct elections for villagers committees was merely a tool to keep the rural population from rioting[15]. In fact, most publications I read on the matter implicitly stated that the economic reforms created cause for social unrest and to allow for civil participation was the central government’s answer. Even more brilliantly, Tan and Pastor argue that the government needs the grassroots democracy for when the economy goes down. “The government will need an escape valve for the people to release their frustrations”[16]. Western scholars seem truly disappointed that the introduction of democracy in China wasn’t ideologically motivated. But I wonder, was “our” democratic transition merely ideological? Isn’t it true that our leaders gave in to popular pressure, silencing the people by giving them a voice, and thus keeping us from rioting? Introduction of democracy is instrumental, and not an end in itself, but isn’t it in any country?
DO CHINESE VILLAGERS ENJOY FREE ELECTIONS?
So whether the Politburo of the CCP is crowded with libertarian ideologists or not, we can safely say that, in comparison with thirty years ago, Chinese people have a greater voice. Two caveats, however: does this greater voice mean a step towards grassroots democracy? Does a louder voice mean that there is greater civilian participation in political matters? The question of how democratic the Chinese village elections are, has been researched extensively over the past two decades. Various studies have composed data on village elections and placed them next to a certain ‘universal standard’ of democratic elections. For instance, aspects of the election process that people in democratic countries find obvious like closed voting booths and anonymous voting were not so obvious in China at first. Also, the degree of openness in the run up to the election is very interesting. International standards say that an election is only really free if there are more candidates for one position. Candidates should have the opportunity to tell the voters what they intend to do with their mandate. Pastor and Tan give a list of key elements of the electoral process that can either signify free or not so free elections[17]. The election management in China is often done by a local CCP-official, which obviously is not ideal, seeing that the contesting candidates might very well not be a member of the Party. Registration is important because people can otherwise vote more than once. Selection of candidates is crucial. If the Party selects the candidates, you can safely say there is no democracy. If everyone can become a candidate, then it is much more fair. It is best of the people can nominate whoever they think is suitable. This is called 海选 (haixuan) or a pick from the sea[18]. All these requirements have been adopted in the Organic Law for Villagers Committees, but the real question obviously is, whether or not they are being followed up. It seems hard to make any hard conclusions. None of the studies available managed to come up with conclusive data, that supports the claim that on a whole village elections are fair and free. This in part is because the Chinese government doesn’t have comprehensive data on a national scale. Most scholars do however argue that the degree of openness is growing. Shi Tianjian for instance explains how the first elections were treated as a formality by local officials, but as the practice grew, civilians started to appeal to the right they now had, to actually make these elections work. As Shi puts it: “once people had tasted this kind of democracy, local officials would have a hard time taking away the right to vote”[19]. And Kevin J. O’Brien puts it this way: “By all accounts, the quality of village elections has improved […], and voter interest is on the rise”[20]. My impression from reading the studies is that the elections might have been introduced to curb social unrest, but ironically now, the threat of popular anger is making officials work harder to arrange for fairer and freer elections. I think it is appropriate to say that the village elections in China are free and open enough to make the idea of elections a success in the minds of the Chinese villagers.
GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY?
So the elections are relatively free, fair and open. After twenty years of experimentation it seems the practice of village level elections has become part of the normal political life. But how democratic is this political life in Chinese villages? Or rather, even if there are free elections, does this mean the society itself is more open? Does this mean there is a incremental institutionalization of real grassroots democracy? Again, these question can only be circumstantially answered. If we take institutionalization as an administrative term, then we can clearly state that the political reform in rural governance has led to a system of villager self-governance. In most cases, the villagers choose their committee members, and the villages are completely self-supporting. The elections have become a inseparable part of this system. More over, in the minds of the Chinese bureaucrats it seems elections became a real trend. At the end of the nineties of the last century, the Chinese leadership began to contemplate township government elections. This next administrative layer, after the village, should be next in the process of incremental democratization[21]. Also, the notion that China has never dealt with or thought of democracy as an ideology is a classic mistake. Some communities in China[22] have had democratic habits for as long as they can remember. He Shaoying depicts the ‘democratic’ practices of the Lahu-people in Yunnan, South-West China. For centuries they have been choosing their leaders in a fixed election process[23].
EMPOWERING VILLAGERS
In order to see how far democratization has come in China, maybe we should first investigate some other issues. Suppose China does have a certain degree of grassroots democracy. Can the degree of institutionalization of democracy be measured by the attitude the peasants have towards their leaders? Li Lianjiang uses this approach to conceive a notion of political trust in rural China. Li’s findings corroborate with the impressions I have been getting recently, that the villagers trust in the central government is unyielding, in comparison with the trust in local officials[24]. This low esteem of local politicians would suggest that villagers do not feel involved. However, Li did not include the Villagers Committee (which is the one body that is actually directly elected) in the questionnaire[25]. So from Li’s study we cannot derive any usable data to claim that villagers feel consulted. The approach Li is using does seem to be a good one, though. My supposition would be, that if villagers would express their trust in Villagers Committees, they would implicitly say they felt like they were participating. In an earlier article by Li, published in the Asian Survey, Li explains why this approach is so useful. “… Chinese villagers feel a higher level of political efficacy after their first free and fair election, because they can now remove unresponsive cadres”[26]. In other words, people start to feel empowered. On the other hand, Shi Tianjian made stunning case in 2001 for allowing some space for the classic argument about the dynamics of East Asian authoritarianism. It seems that data proves that to a certain extent, Chinese people have a principally higher trust in their government[27].
PEOPLE’S POWER
Where is this sense of democratic empowerment coming from? The central leadership can offer the scheme of self-governance and elections, but they cannot tell the people to participate in political affairs. The people have to want this, they have to stride for being heard. As Zhou Xiaohong puts it: “… even though village democracy is […] a top-down initiative, […] villager participation itself is voluntary and not compelled”[28]. When comparing grassroots democracy in India and China, George Mathew noticed that the movement of direct elections and a true representation of villager’s needs and desires, came about through popular pressure. “…[it] was mainly because the unrelenting pressure of people’s quests for meaningful democracy at the grassroots level [and] demands for people’s involvement…”[29]. So we can conclude that real participation, or democracy if you will, is manifested only when the people demand it.
THE ECONOMY AND THE DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE
There are some theories on the demand for participation. The Social Mobilization Theory claims that economical development and legitimacy form the prerequisite for democracy[30]. It was an article by Seymour Martin Lipset in The American Political Science Review in 1959 that China scholars still refer to when they claim that liberal democracy will come to China as long as the market economy continues to liberalize. However, this has long ago been proven an illusion, if not wishful thinking by some western scholars. There is no direct correlation between market economy and democratization. There are, on the other hand, certain ties between the economical situation and the degree of democratization. Research done by Shi Tianjian provides us with data that seems to suggest that the villages in China with a relatively developed economy are less likely to see political development[31]. This might be because economic development consolidates the powers of incumbent leaders because, Shi suggests, people become more dependent on the leaders, leaders have more resources to bribe their superiors (to ignore the election results) or leaders have more resources to co-opt peasants. A study by David Zweig and Chung Siu Fung also suggests a negative relation between economic development and the degree of democracy. Their data suggests that richer villages are less democratic. One of the reasons they cited was that wealthy villagers, when asked if they felt more democracy was needed, answered that as long as there was steady economic growth, no reform was necessary[32]. So there is no positive relation between economic reform and political reform. We can, however, say that there are indirect relations. For instance, economic development gives people a louder voice. Think of the current demand by civilians in China for better consumer rights, after fifty children died having consumed poisonous milk powder[33]. As Shi puts it: “economic development […] significantly influenced the attitudes of […] the political elites […], increased the peasants resources and skills and enhanced their desire to get involved in the decision-making process in their villages”(italics added)[34]. There is reason to believe that interesting things are going to happen in the coming years in China. The Chinese situation requires us to reconsider all traditional theories on the correlation between economic development and political reform.
CONCLUSION
So grassroots democracy is gradually manifesting itself in rural China, not just in administrative meaning, but also as an abstract idea in the minds of villagers. My paper tries to show that the efficiency of the Villagers Committees in governing rural affairs is not equivocally clear. The authority of any government body in village affairs depends on various features of the village. The smallest villages do not seem to be in great need of central governance, nor does there seem to be a real necessity for institutionalized sself-governance. The bigger, more industrialized villages on the other hand have a great deal of dependency on their local representation, especially towards the other villages and higher level of government bodies. This is a largely economically motivated interest. Furthermore I have tried to explain why the institutionalization of grassroots democracy is very visible, however incremental it might be. As an administrative notion, villager’s self-governance seems to be deeply rooted by now. The creeping democratization in rural China is not self-evident. Not enough research has been done to supply scholars with data that might confirm an increased feeling of trust towards governing bodies. However, I would like to state some thoughts. The fact that more and more people are becoming economically empowered, suggests an societal empowerment that in my opinion is already visible. The recent developments in web-culture, from the incredibly popular bulletin boards to the blogosphere in general, make it clear to me that Chinese all over the country are becoming more voiced on social issues. Whether this has significant consequences for the political reform has yet to be seen. But one thing is clear. No matter what top-down initiatives might arise in Chinese politics, real manifestation of grassroots democracy will have to come from the people themselves.
November 12th, 2008 Thomas de Groot, Amsterdam
[1] He Shaoying, “The Evolution and Function of the Kaxie System of the Lahu People in South-west China”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, M. Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007), 396
[2] Minxin Pei, “Contradictory Trends and Confusing Signals”, Journal of Democracy 14:1 (January 2003);
Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”, Journal of Democracy 14:1 (January 2003).
[3] R. Keith Schoppa, The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 129
[4] The land still technically belonged to the state, so the farmers didn’t have the right to randomly sell it. In October 2008 the government finally liberalized the individual land ownership:
Xinhua News, “在新的起点上推进农村改革发展一一党的十七届三中全会传递的政策信号”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-10/12/content_10184361.htm (chinese) (visited 08-11-2008)
Xinhua News, “CCP Closes Major Meeting with Decision on Rural Reform, Development”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/12/content_10183313.htm (english) (visited 08-11-2008)
[5] Guan Juanjuan, Explaining Rural Democracy in China (Leiden: Master thesis Public Administration, 2005), 20.
[6] Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Accommodating “Democracy” in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China”, The China Quarterly (2000): 467.
[7]Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, “Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages”, The China Quarterly 162 (June 2000): 515.
[8] Ibid. p. 524
[9] George Mathew, “Local Government System in India and China: Learning from Each Other”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, M. Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007), 36.
[10] Ma Rong, “Changes in Local Administration and their Impact on Community Life in the Grasslands of Inner Mongolia”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, Ma Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007), 149.
[11] Yang Shenming, “The Environment, the Family and Local Government among the Tajik People”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, Ma Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007), 36.
[12] Oi and Rozelle, p. 532
[13] Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century”, The China Journal 45 (January 2001): 22.
[14] Ray Yep, Maintaining Stability in Rural China: Challenges and Responses (Center for Northeastern Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, 2002), 15.
[15] Ibid, p. 8.
[16] Robert A. Pastor and Tan Qingshan, “The Meaning of China’s Village Elections”, The China Quarterly 162 (June 2000): 512
[17] Ibid. p. 493
[18] Later on this term became very significant in Chinese pop-culture, thanks to the immensely popular tv-show Supergirl (超女 chaonü). The term was used consequently to mean that everyone could decide to participate in this show, and even more interesting, in the second year of the show, everyone in China could vote by text-message on their preferred singer. So 海选 （haixuan ） is a word that everyone associates with democracy and participation of some sort. http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzYwOTg1MzY=.html
[19] Shi Tianjian, “Rural Democracy in China”, East Asian Institute Contemporary China Series 24 (2000): 16.
[20] Kevin J. O’Brien, “Villagers, elections and Citizenship in Contemporary China”, Modern China 27:4 (October 2001): 418.
[21] Tony Saich and Yang Xuedong, “Selecting Within the Rules: Institutional Innovation in China’s Governance”, ”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, Ma Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007), 93.
[22] Note that “China” is just a geographical entity, and not an ethnic or cultural one.
[23] He Shaoying, “The Evolution and Function of the Kaxie System of the Lahu People in South-west China”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, M. Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007), 401.
[24] Li Lianjiang, “Political Trust in Rural China”, Modern China 30:2 (April 2004): 229
[25] Ibid; p. 254
[26] Li Lianjiang, “The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China”, Asian Survey 63:4 (July/August 2003):648.
[27] Shi Tianjian, “Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan”, Comparative Politics 33:4 (June 2001): 415
[28] Zhou Xiaohong, “Rural Political Participation in the Maoist and Post-Mao Periods”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, Ma Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007) p. 88
[29]George Mathew, “Local Government System in India and China: Learning from Each Other”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, Ma Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007) p. 37
[30] Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review 53:1 (March 1959): p. 71
[31] Shi Tianjian, “Rural Democracy in China”, East Asian Institute Contemporary China Series 24 (2000): p. 51
[32] David Zweig and Chung Siu Fung, “Democracy, Good Governance and Economic Development in Rural China”, in Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, Ma Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007) p. 346
[33] For a humorous approach, take a look at these images from angry netizens: http://www.chinasmack.com/pictures/kidney-stone-gate-netizens-make-use-sanlu-photoshops/
[34] Shi Tianjian, “Rural Democracy in China”, East Asian Institute Contemporary China Series 24 (2000): p. 50
REFERENCES
* Guan Juanjuan, Explaining Rural Democracy in China (Leiden: Master thesis Public Administration, 2005).
* Li Lianjiang, “The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China”, Asian Survey 63:4 (July/August 2003): p. 648-662
* Li Lianjiang, “Political Trust in Rural China”, Modern China 30:2 (April 2004): p. 228-258
* Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review 53:1 (March 1959): p. 69-105.
* Grass-roots Democracy in India and China: The Right to Participate, ed. M. Mohanty, R. Baum, Ma Rong and G. Mathew (New Dehli: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2007)
# David Zweig and Chung Siu Fung, “Democracy, Good Governance and Economic Development in Rural China” p. 339-362
# Mathew, “Local Government System in India and China: Learning from Each Other” p. 33-52
# Zhou Xiaohong, “Rural Political Participation in the Maoist and Post-Mao Periods” p. 73-92
# He Shaoying, “The Evolution and Function of the Kaxie System of the Lahu People in South-west China” p. 391-408
# Tony Saich and Yang Xuedong, “Selecting Within the Rules: Institutional Innovation in China’s Governance” p. 93-122
# Yang Shenming, “The Environment, the Family and Local Government among the Tajik People” p. 379-390
# Ma Rong, “Changes in Local Administration and their Impact on Community Life in the Grasslands of Inner Mongolia”, p. 141-160.
* Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”, Journal of Democracy 14:1 (January 2003): p. 5-17.
* Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Accommodating “Democracy” in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China”, The China Quarterly (2000): p. 465-489.
* Kevin J. O’Brien, “Villagers, elections and Citizenship in Contemporary China”, Modern China 27:4 (October 2001): p. 407-435.
* Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, “Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages”, The China Quarterly 162 (June 2000): p. 513-539.
* Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century”, The China Journal 45 (January 2001): p. 21-35.
* Robert A. Pastor and Tan Qingshan, “The Meaning of China’s Village Elections”, The China Quarterly 162 (June 2000): p. 490-512.
* Minxin Pei, “Contradictory Trends and Confusing Signals”, Journal of Democracy 14:1 (January 2003)
* R. Keith Schoppa, The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 129.
* Shi Tianjian, “Rural Democracy in China”, East Asian Institute Contemporary China Series 24 (2000).
* Shi Tianjian, “Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan”, Comparative Politics 33:4 (June 2001): p. 401-419.
* Ray Yep, Maintaining Stability in Rural China: Challenges and Responses (Center for Northeastern Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, 2002)
* Chinasmack
http://www.chinasmack.com/pictures/kidney-stone-gate-netizens-make-use-sanlu-photoshops/ (visited 08-11-2008)
* Youku
http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzYwOTg1MzY=.html (visited 08-11-2008)
* Xinhua News, “在新的起点上推进农村改革发展一一党的十七届三中全会传递的政策信号”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-10/12/content_10184361.htm (chinese) (visited 08-11-2008)
* Xinhua News, “CCP Closes Major Meeting with Decision on Rural Reform, Development”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/12/content_10183313.htm (english) (visited 08-11-2008)
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